Limited Partnerships and Reputation Formation by Kallberg, Jarl G et al.
Cornell University School of Hotel Administration 
The Scholarly Commons 
Articles and Chapters School of Hotel Administration Collection 
9-2004 
Limited Partnerships and Reputation Formation 
Jarl G. Kallberg 
New York University 
Crocker H. Liu 
Cornell University, chl62@cornell.edu 
Anand Srinivasan 
University of Georgia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/articles 
 Part of the Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kallberg, J. G., Liu, C. H., & Srinivasan, A. (2004). Limited partnerships and reputation formation 
[Electronic version]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 39(3), 631-659. Retrieved [insert date], 
from Cornell University, School of Hospitality Administration site: http://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/
articles/11/ 
This Article or Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Hotel Administration Collection 
at The Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles and Chapters by an authorized 
administrator of The Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact hotellibrary@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Limited Partnerships and Reputation Formation 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes the optimal quality decision of a producer in a multi-period setting with reputation 
effects. Using a unique database of returns on real estate limited partnerships (RELPs), we empirically 
examine alternative theoretical predictions of optimal producer strategy. In particular, we test whether the 
producers in our market invest in reputation building by initially selling high quality goods and then 
lowering quality. Using a variety of statistical tests, we find evidence consistent with reputation building, 
both in the aggregate and for individual developers. 
Keywords 
real estate limited partnerships, RELPs, reputation, quality 
Disciplines 
Real Estate 
Comments 
Required Publisher Statement 
© Cambridge University Press. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. 
This article or chapter is available at The Scholarly Commons: https://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/articles/11 
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS VOL. 39. NO. 3, SEPTEMBEH 2004 
COPYRIGHT 2004, SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON SEATTLE WA 96195 
Limited Partnerships and Reputation Formation 
Jarl G. Kallberg, Crocker H. Liu, and Anand Srinivasan* 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes tlic optimal quality decision of a producer in a multi-period setting with 
reputation effects. Using a unique database of returns on real estate limited partnerships 
(RELPs), we empirically examine alternative theoretical predictions of optimal producer 
strategy. In particular, we test whether the producers in our market invest in reputation 
building by initially selling high quality goods and then lowering quality. Using a variety of 
statistical tests, we find evidence consistent with reputation building, both in the aggregate 
and for individual developers. 
I. Introduction 
. . . economists have long considered "reputations" and brand names to 
be private devices which provide incentives thai assure contract perfor-
mance in the absence of any third-party enforcer. This private-contract 
enforcement mechanism relies upon the value to the firm of repeat sales 
to satisfied customers as a means of preventing nonperformance. How-
ever, it is possible that economic agents with well known brand names 
and reputation for honoring contracts may find it wealth maximizing 
to break such long-term exchange relationships and obtain a temporary 
increase in profit (Klein and Leffier (1981), p. 615). 
Many interesting financial problems involve asymmetries of information be-
tween the seller and potential buyers of a good. In the seminal lemons paradigm 
of Akerlof 11970), the fact that the seller has superior information about the qual-
ity of the assets being sold implies that the goods being sold would be of lower 
'Kallherg, jk;tllher(n>steni.nyu.edu, and Liu. cliu^siern.nyu.edu. Department of Finance, Stern 
School nf Business, New York University. 44 West 4th St., New York, NY 10012; Srinivasan. 
asrinivat13 terry.uga.edu. Department of Banking and Finance, Terry College of Business, University of 
Georgia, Brooks Hall, Athens. OA 31)602. We thank Stephen Brown (the editor), and Matthew Spiegel 
Ithe referee) for many helpful suggestions. We also thank John Clapp. Ned Elton, William Greene, 
Martin timber, George Hamilton, Spencer Jefferies, Kose John, Chris Mayer, Joe Perez. Rangarajan 
Sundaram. Gregory Udell, and seminar participants at the AKA, the University of Connecticut, and 
the University of Melbourne for constructive comments. We also thank Richard Leviae for research 
assistance with this project. Data for this project were acquired using a research grant from the Stern 
School of Business, New1 York University. 
631 
632 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 
than average quality, eventually leading to market failure.! However, the situa-
tion is less obvious it" there are repeated sales, as the above quotation suggests. 
For example, produeers may initially be compelled to produce a higher quality 
product than otherwise optimal in order to overcome this "lemons premium." The 
repeated game setting thus creates a tension between the incentives to exploit in-
formational asymmetries and the value of establishing a reputation for quality. 
The optimally of various strategies depends on. inter alia, the speed of informa-
tion dissemination and the gains to reputation building. 
Numerous theoretical models analyze this sequence of quality setting deci-
sions, focusing on a producer that has the anility to change its quality- in each 
period of a multi-period, discrete-time (potentially infinite-period) model. How-
ever. these models have undergone relatively little empirical testing. Motivated by 
this gap in the literature, this study uses a unique database of returns on real estate 
limited partnerships (RELPs) to empirically investigate quality setting strategies 
of the producer. We run two basic tests; first, we test whether producers choose 
to initially build a reputation for quality and then produce lower quality goods 
in subsequent periods. In this case, we should observe a decreasing trend in the 
returns on the sequence of offerings of a given sponsor. We also explore alter-
native explanations for a declining trend in returns. Second, we test for mixing 
strategies, where the producer alternatively selects quality from either a high or 
a low quality regime. In this case, we should be able to identify two statistically 
different distributions of the producer's observed quality. 
The RELP market provides an ideal setting for evaluating predictions con-
cerning quality/reputation strategies for several important reasons. First, almost 
all empirical studies on the links between reputation and quality are based on in-
ferences gained from experimental settings.' Second, RELPs are perhaps more 
amenable to testing the theoretical predictions of quality/reputation models than 
the other studies that use real data.4 In particular, the RELPs in our study are 
established as "blind pools." that is, the funds for the partnership are raised prior 
to the developer actually purchasing any properties. This means that the devel-
oper (producer) has a great deal of flexibility in setting the quality level of the 
partnership. Absent signiticanl reputation effects, there are thus incentives for the 
developer to take advantage of these information asymmetries. However, over 
time, as the cash flows from the properties are realized, the quality of the devel-
oper (and the RELP) is gradually revealed, albeit with some noise. In our analysis, 
we equate the "true quality" of a partnership with the adjusted holding period re-
turns (i.e., returns relative to a RELP index and adjusted for year of origination) 
to the partnership unit holder. Finally, our data are extensive enough, in terms 
'This model has been extensively tested; see, tor example. Cienesove (1993). 
-Tirole 11 98K) presents an overview of the economic literature on quality and reputation. 
'Examples include articles dealing with learning and reputation in bargaining games (for example, 
Roth and Sehoumaker < I9K4). Neelin. Sonnensehcin. and Spiegel (1988), and Binniore, Shaked, and 
Sutton (1985)1. tests of reputation and entry deterrence (such as Jung, Kagel, and Levin (1994). who 
test the chain store game of Selden f I97K)). and more general tesis of reputation and learning (e.g., 
Bloomlield (1994)). 
JThe empirical studies of reputation effects (hat we are aware of using real data are: Slade (1992), 
who uses Kalman tillering to lest for supergame pricing strategies in gasoline retailing; Zupau (I9K9), 
who (ests for predatory pricing behavior in cable television leasing; and Gorton (1996), who analyzes 
reputation formation in [9th century bank note markets. 
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of observations of individual developers and of a given developer's offerings, to 
allow for reasonable statistical inferences. 
Our empirical work, can most easily be interpreted through Shapiro's (1983b 1 
and Diamond's (1989) multi-period models of reputation formation. The litera-
ture on "experience goods" is also relevant.5 The quality setting model of Shapiro 
(1982), (1983a), (1983b) assumes that the producer is a monopolist that sets quan-
tity and quality at each point in time so as to maximize expected utility by solving 
for an equilibrium quality setting strategy. He shows that for sufficiently high lev-
els of reputation, it cannot pay to build up reputation continually. This eventual 
decline in quality is a testable hypothesis. Shapiro, less formally, also analyzes the 
possibility of mixing behavior. The model of Diamond (1989), (1991) considers 
the possibility of gaming behavior among the producers and buyers. While this 
model is of debt markets, it is a powerful tool for modeling reputation effects.6 A 
key component in Diamond's model is the evolution of the producer's reputation. 
In the initial period, all borrowers are identical so that all are charged the same 
borrowing rate, However, in subsequent periods, potential lenders can observe 
whether the borrower defaulted. Diamond assumes that in each period a new set 
of lenders emerges knowing only the track record of potential borrowers. In equi-
librium, any borrower that defaults will subsequently be unable to borrow. This 
implies that the equilibrium interest rate will decline over time as the aggregate 
quality of surviving borrowers improves. This decline in interest rates provides an 
empirical test of reputation formation in the aggregate. This effect, and other as-
pects of Diamond's model, is tested in Gorton (1996), which examines the market 
for bank notes in the 19th century. Gorton finds statistically significant evidence 
for a reputation effect in note prices. In addition to inferences about the aggregate 
population. Diamond's model also has empirical predictions about the behavior 
of individual borrowers. One that will be tested in our model is the presence of 
mixed strategies in the equilibrium.7 
Although the model setting that Shapiro employs differs from that of Dia-
mond, both models yield similar implications. In particular, producers choose to 
initially build a reputation for quality and then produce lower quality goods in 
subsequent periods. If this proposition holds, then we should observe a decreas-
ing trend in the returns on the sequence of offerings of a given sponsor. There is 
also a possibility that producers engage in mixing strategies. If this is the case, 
then we should observe two different quality distributions. 
We find that, consistent with the theoretical predictions of the reputation 
building hypothesis, the average quality decreases with each successive partner-
ship issued by a given sponsor. This result is valid in the aggregate as well as 
for the majority of the sponsors in our sample. We also find that some produc-
ers engage in mixing strategies, producing high quality in some periods and low 
quality in others. However, it is important to observe that our results are influ-
sExperience goads are goods whose quality cannot be determined precisely in one period. The 
usual setting involves the producer choosing the mean of the quality distribution. Alternasively, quality 
can only be observed with noise. In either ease, some type of Bayesian updating is typically used to 
revise the estimates of the producer's quality in each period. 
^While developed as a mode! for debt markets. Diamond II198yj, p. K29) notes that his model is 
also applicable to reputation formation in general 
' The conditions for the existence of mixed strategies aie given in Diamond's Lemma 11. 
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enced by survivorship and incubation bias (since poor sponsors are unlikely to 
be around long enough to produce many offerings). Furthermore, a number of 
sponsors tended to hold one type of property in their initial offerings, and another 
type in their later offerings, potentially moving outside of their initial property 
type or location expertise. This would also contribute to decreases in returns over 
time. Finally, since our data set is small, the statistical significance of our results 
is relatively weak and, as such, our results should be considered suggestive rather 
than conclusive. 
The outline of the remainder of the study is as follows. Section II provides an 
overview of the basic institutional setting. Section III describes the data. Section 
IV analyzes our results and Section V presents our conclusions. The Appendix 
briefly reviews the relevant empirical methodology. 
II. Institutional Environment 
RELPs represent an important mechanism for individual investors to pool 
their resources to participate in real estate. In contrast to traditional securities, 
partnerships typically represent direct investment in businesses (such as real es-
tate) and are not publicly traded. Moreover, partnerships are neither rated by a 
rating agency nor followed by Wall Street analysts. The general partner (GP) or-
ganizes and assumes responsibility for running the partnership. Partnerships are 
not required to publish the values of their assets and. as such, calculating capital 
gains and market values accurately is difficult. Most public partnerships require 
a minimum investment of $1,000 to $5,000 and they are actively marketed to 
"small" investors. Typically, the partnership is structured as a blind pool wherein 
the general partner (the sponsor) has not bought any assets until the offering is 
completely sold. Legally, a partnership must have a finite life, which is usually 
set at 50 years or more, to allow the general partner flexibility in timing the sale 
of properties. 
Market participants in the initial offerings are almost always individual in-
vestors. while institutions dominate the secondary market. Secondary market 
trading in these RFiLPs is done at substantial discounts (an average of 45%) to 
appraised value. These points are elucidated in Barber ((l°%), p. 490): 
The relation between current yields, leverage and discounts supports 
an agency cost explanation for the observed discounts. Reputation is 
particularly critical in the market for limited partnerships, which are 
traded in an unorgani/.ed secondary market and have been consistently 
plagued by negative coverage in the financial press. 
The general partner usually has complete discretion on what properties to 
purchase. For example, the prospectus of First Capital Income Properties Series 
VII reads: "No specific properties have yet been identified for acquisition by 
the partnership as of the date of" this prospectus, and the General Partners have 
complete discretion in investing the proceeds of this offering." 
We sampled over 50 prospectuses of different partnerships and different 
sponsors. Only one had information on a few properties that the general part-
ner intended to purchase with the proceeds of the offering. 
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With regard to the sale of properties, the partnership agreement does not 
usually bind the general partner in any way. However, many of the prospectuses 
have statements on when the general partner intends to start selling the property. 
A typical example from a partnership sponsored by JMB Corporation reads: 
The Partnership intends to hold the real properties it acquires until such 
time as sale or other disposition appears to be advantageous from the 
viewpoint of the Partnership's investment objectives. In general, the 
Partnership intends to sell or refinance properties between the fifth and 
twelfth years after acquisition . . . However, the Corporate general part-
ner will not be obligated to sell properties at any particular time. 
Most of the partnership agreements stated expected time of sale between the 
fifth and fifteenth years. From the supplemental information provided subsequent 
to the offering, it was determined the proceeds are invested, in most part, within 
two years of the offering. 
Because of the informational asymmetries associated with this organiza-
tional form, RELPs are particularly susceptible to the agent (general partner or 
sponsor) choosing actions that are suboptimal from the principal's (limited part-
ner or unit holder) perspective. This issue of conflicting incentives between the 
general and limited partners has been well documented. An example is Wolf-
son's ( m91) empirical analysis of oil and gas tax shelter programs. He cites the 
following excerpt from a drilling prospectus: 
Should a Partnership acquire or lease or participate in drilling or pro-
ducing operations on a Prospect in proximity to that of the General Part-
ner or its Affiliates, the results of such activity by the Partnership may 
gratuitously benefit the General Partner or its Affiliates . . . [This may] 
result in profits to the General Partner or its Affiliates, and such profits 
will not be paid to the Partnerships. 
In our setting, the flurry of investor lawsuits involving misdealing, fraud and 
deceptive sales practices against the brokerage houses selling these RELPs pro-
vides us with ex post evidence of these incentive problems. These lawsuits have 
led the Securities and Exchange Commission to investigate whether Wall Street 
firms such as Dean Witter, Paine Webber, Merrill Lynch. Shearson, and Pruden-
tial Securities, among others, misrepresented partnership risk and rewards.s These 
observations suggest that, in the primary market, general partners might take ad-
vantage of relatively uninformed buyers. In the secondary market, as more in-
formation on asset quality is revealed, we expect prices to reflect more rational 
levels. This allows us to reasonably accurately assess the underlying quality of 
the RELP over time in our empirical analysis. However, as noted earlier, our tests 
cannot rule out other possible explanations for the evolution of the market. For 
example, it is plausible that, as the market for RELPs developed, investors became 
"These Wall Slreet lirms are not only !he biggest marketers of partnerships bul they also sponsor 
the partnerships. For example, Paine Webber sold ahuul S2 billion in limited partnerships according 
to the New York Times (November 28, 1994). including the Paine Webber real estate partnership, 
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more familiar with the risk-return trade-offs and thus the market risk premium for 
RELPs changed." 
There has been relatively little research into limited partnerships, particu-
larly real estate limited partnerships. Most studies focus on RELP performance. 
Rogers and Owers (1985) find that only investors in the highest marginal tax 
bracket earn an adequate after-tax return. Kapplin and Schwartz (1986) re-evaluate 
the performance characteristics of publicly offered RELPs using secondary mar-
ket prices and find that the returns in Rogers and Owers (1985) are overstated.'" 
Kapplin and Schwartz (1988) find that returns on pre-1981 RELPs are similar to 
institutional grade real estate, while more recent RELPs tend to underperform in-
stitutional properties. Kallberg and Liu (1995) relate recent RELP performance 
to characteristics of sponsors and underlying properties; they find that the sponsor 
is one of the most important determinants of RELP performance. 
III. Experimental Data and Design 
Data on secondary market prices, liquidations, and cash distributions were 
obtained from Robert A. Stanger & Company beginning in January 1. 1990 and 
ending in December 31, 1995. The time period studied coincides with the ad-
vent of reported secondary market prices for RELPs. All partnerships studied are 
publicly registered and are blind pools. Sponsors with less than six RELPs were 
excluded from our individual sponsor statistical analysis since there would be in-
sufficient time-series data: this results in a sample of 253 RELPs. although the 
larger sample of 308 is used in computing the benchmark returns. Excluded from 
all of the subsequent analysis are partnerships that did not trade or traded very 
infrequently. As such, the data are biased toward actively traded partnerships of 
relatively large sponsors. 
Origination dates associated with the partnerships studied range from 1977 
to 1989. The total dollar volume of RELPs outstanding vs. the amount in our 
sample is depicted in Figure I, Our data represent 55'/?- of the total. The remain-
ing 45% are mainly RELPs that did not trade in the secondary market, making it 
impossible to determine their rates of return. The annual fluctuation in total vol-
umes is substantial and reflects the large number of issues in the early 1980s and 
the subsequent liquidation of older RELPs. Although the earlier RELPs are likely 
to be liquidating a significant number of their properties over our price observa-
tion window, we find that the amount of liquidation does not significantly affect 
returns," 
Returns used in the following analysis are holding period returns calculated 
over the 1990 through 1995 observation window. There is one excess (total pe-
riod) return associated with each RELP calculated as follows. Initially, the total 
yA.s clarified later in this section, we mitigate this bias by adjusting our measure of quality for year 
of RELP issuance. 
'"The differential in the returns between the two studies is partly attributable to the sample si/.c 
I Kapplin and Schwart/- had a larger sample), the age of the partnerships (Kapplin and Schwart/ had 
younger RELPs). the time period examined, and subjective classifications of the distinction between 
income-oriented and tax-oriented RELPs. 
1
' A regression of return vs. percentage of liquidation had an ff • of less than 1 'A and an insignificant 
/•'-statistic. 
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FIGURE 1 
Total Real Estate Limited Partnership (RELP) Volume 
RELP volume by year 
• Aggregate RELP vCJume 
• SampJe volume 
-g 2000 
1000 
77 78 7fl 
Figure 1 depic ts Ihe total RELP volume I in $mill ions) over our sample per iod It shows thai our sample conlams approxi-
mately 5 5 % ot the total dollar ralurne 
raw return in each quarter is calculated for each RELP based on observed trans-
action prices and cash distributions (liquidations and dividends).12 These raw 
returns are then modified by two factors. First, we compute the excess return by 
deducting the benchmark RELP return, which is an equally weighted average of 
all RELP returns available in the given quarter, from the raw return. Second, from 
this excess return, we make a further adjustment to account for trend or learn-
ing in our data. An OLS regression was run on average excess RELP returns 
vs. dummy variables for the year of origination. These dummy variable coeffi-
cients are then used to adjust the excess RELP return for year of origination.,3 
Thus, the quality of a given RELP is (he raw holding period return adjusted for 
the benchmark return and year of origin. We call this figure the adjusted return. 
Henceforth, this adjusted return will be our empirical proxy for the "true qual-
ity" of the RELP. In the context of the Shapiro or Diamond models, it reflects 
the quality level chosen by the sponsor. This characterization corresponds to the 
experience goods setting, since the buyer cannot establish the true quality of the 
asset until a significant amount of time has passed. 
We first test for trends in average quality. The tests are based on splitting the 
sequence of a developer's partnerships into halves and performing simple tests for 
mean and variance shifts between the two subsamples. In the subsequent analysis, 
for each developer, we will refer to the first half of its RELP issues as the first 
period and the second half of its RELP issues as the second period. Naturally 
these "time periods" will differ for each developer. 
'-In less than l'/r of the cases, a simple linear interpolation of prices was used if there was a quarter 
without an observed price. 
'• An earlier version of this paper did not incorporate this trend correction. Those results are quali-
tatively nearly identical to those given below and arc available from the authors. 
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We perform further tests (Quandt (1958), (I960), (1972), Brown, Durbin, 
and Evans (1975), and Quandt and Ramsey (1978)) to see if developers change 
their quality regimes or engage in mixing strategies.14 For example, the finding of 
a higher variance in the first period and a lower mean in the second, is consistent 
both with markets learning more about the appropriate risk premium for a given 
developer, and with a strategy of mixing from a distribution in the first period (in 
order to make it difficult to uncover quality in the first period) and then in the sec-
ond period to milk its reputation (in the parlance of Shapiro) by producing lower 
quality goods. This strategy is, in a sense, a variant of the reputation building 
story, where the developer, instead of building a reputation, injects variance into 
its quality level. The details of these tests are described in the Appendix. The 
tests are also performed on a pooled basis to test for overall reputation effects. A 
t- (F-) test is then computed to test if the mean (variance) in period 1 is higher 
than the mean (variance) in period 2. 
IV. Empirical Results 
A. Sample Characteristics 
Table I presents the general characteristics of our RELP sample. Panel A 
shows the total dividend payout by 1987 to 1989 as a percentage of initial capital. 
By the end of 1989, the average RELP had paid out 25.4% of its initial capital as 
dividends. The average leverage (total debt over total initial capital) in our sample 
is 27.3%. One measure of RELP quality, which we will use later in this section, 
is the rating given LPs by Partnership Profiles. It is a rating from 1 (the highest) 
to 5. Separate ratings are given to financial condition and to cash distributions as 
of December 31, 1989; the respective averages for our sample are 1.69 and 3.35. 
The average cost basis value of our RELPs is $85.5 million. Panel B of Table 
I shows these RELP characteristics by RELP issuance sequence. The cost basis 
of the RELPs rises significantly from the iirst issue ($53.1 million) to the tenth 
RELP issued by a sponsor ($111.9 million). The Partnership Profile ratings for 
both financial condition and cash distributions decline slightly, although neither 
trend is significant. The downward trend in raw returns is also evident. 
Table 2 shows the mean, semi-annual returns over our six-year observation 
window (January 1990 to December 1995) organized by offering number: the fig-
ures are unadjusted returns formed from data on cash distributions and secondary 
market prices. The in-sample group consists of the 253 offerings by developers 
with at least six RELPs in (he sample: the out-of-sample group consists of the 52 
offerings by developers with live or fewer RELPs.I? The most important feature is 
the trend of decreasing returns, which suggests an aggregate reputation effect. For 
the in-sample group, six of the first 10 offerings have positive mean returns: four 
of offerings 11 through 20 have positive mean returns; offerings 21 through 30 
11
 While we recognize that the power associated with the Brown. Durbin. and Evans (1975) test 
is limited relative lo thut of the Chow test, we tise the BDE test sinec we do not know ex ante when 
Ihe structural change occurs. The advantage of (he Chow test diminishes when the regime shift is 
unknown. See Chapter 7 of Greene 120(H)) for further details. 
lsThe latter group is omitted from our more detailed statistical analysis because we judged thai live 
RELPs was too small a sample to permit inferences about trends in quality. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Characteristics 
Panel A General Characteristics 
Statistic 
Cumulative dividends till 1989 
Cumulative dividends till 1988 
Cumulative dividends till 19B7 
Leverage 
Operating income (in $OOOs) 
Financial condilion ratrng 
Cash distribution rating 
Gross revenue (in $0005) 
Cost basis (in SOOOs) 
No ol Obs 
135 
• - i 
ton 
... 131 
' • - : • 
i 
i •., 
Panel B Characteristics by Partnership Sequence Number 
Statistic 2 : • • 
25 4% 
22 8 * 
?1 2% 
27 3% 
2,418 
1 69 
3 30 
7.312 
8S.4B9 
Std. Dev. 
21.2% 
19 7% 
18 2% 
29 8% 
4.004 
1 31 
7,506 
90.16U 
11 
Cumulative dividends till 19B7(%! 
Cumulative dividends till 19B8 (%) 
Cumuiative dividends till 1989 (%) 
Avg year ot commencement 
Leverage (%) 
Operating income (in SOOOs) 
Financial condition rating 
Cash distribution rating 
Gross revenue (in SOOOs) 
Cosl basis (in SOOOs) 
31 9 
36.5 
39 1 
1981 
31.6 
1,425 
3 36 
5.20B 
53.077 
34 5 
34 0 
42 6 
1983 
23 5 
2,174 
1.80 
3 15 
6,218 
64,105 
27.3 
34 4 
34 8 
1983 
31 1 
1,458 
2 14 
3-58 
5.402 
65,778 
21 1 
• > : • 
30 0 
1984 
233 
3.326 
1 93 
3.43 
7.845 
79,463 
i t ; : 
< 2\ 9 
1985 
28 1 
3.374 
1 40 
3.27 
7.315 
B5.502 
22 6 
194 
167 
1986 
11 7 
4.760 
1 18 
2 91 
7.576 
88934 
18.5 
160 
11 7 
1986 
213 
1.773 
133 
3 22 
4.B34 
59.297 
22 2 
153 
1986 
184 
3.154 
144 
3.22 
6,604 
88 694 
163 
12.4 
108 
1987 
29 0 
1.916 
140 
320 
8.341 
103.288 
• > 
4 1 
1987 
382 
896 
200 
3 75 
9,681 
111 885 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics lor the complete sample of RELPs The firsl three rows give (he average dividend 
distributions as a percentage of initial capital Irom the partnerships inception until 1987, 1988, and 1989 The cosl basis 
ol the properties is the total capitalized cost before depreciation, amortisation, and properly value writedowns Total 
leverage is measured with respect to the total cost basis of the properties The ratings are Irom Stangers Partnership 
Profiles, ranging Irom 1 (best) to 5. The ratings and the financial statement data are as of the end of 1989 Panel B 
disaggregates this data by offering number 
have no positive mean returns. Note that it is difficult to draw too much statistical 
inference at this point because the number of observations drops off rapidly after 
offering number 13.16 Additionally, the data show no significant differences be-
tween the in-sample and out-of-sample average returns for offerings one through 
five, suggesting that our results will not be overly influenced by survivorship or 
incubation bias. In the statistical analysis, we will present detailed evidence of 
the reputation effect both on the aggregate level and for individual developers in 
our sample. 
It is of interest to investigate the aggregate behavior of the RELP developers 
in our sample before focusing on individual developers. Figure 2 plots the ad-
justed return for each RELP ordered by issuance date. Thus, the .v-axis value of i 
represents the adjusted return of the ith RELP for each developer. The regression 
of adjusted returns vs. offering number shows a significant negative coefficient 
on offering number and a significant positive constant.I7 This suggests that, even 
after censoring out developers with fewer than six RELPs, and after netting out 
"•For the in-sample data, only three observations were significant at the ().]() level. These were 
significant negative returns for offerings nine, 11, and 12. None of the out-of-sample observations 
were significantly different from /ero. 
|7This regression uses White's correction for heteroskedastie errors, k includes all sponsors (20) 
wilh six or more partnerships, yielding a total of 253 observations. The i-scatisties are given in paren-
theses. The r-statislic cm the slope coefficient is significant at the 0.003 level. 
R = 0.0418-
(1,947) 
0.00487 x RELP number 
(-2.989) 
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TABLE 2 
In- and Out-of-Samp!e Raw Returns by Offering Number 
In-Sample 
Offer No 
1 
2 
3 
4 
& 6 
• 
a 
: i 
"> 11 
• 
13 
• - 1 
l£ 
• i 
17 
IE 
1Q 
2C 
:>i 
:>.-
: • • -
24 
25 
. ' < • 
21 
: " • 
29 
30 
Mean 
- 1 70% 
: - - > - . 
• • i 
1 31% 
8 19% 
-0.77% 
- 4 85% 
0.17% 
- 6 46% 
• . . ; • > • . 
-6.15% 
J i „ ' 
- 1 5 6 % 
- 1 13% 
3 50% 
12.76% 
2 3 1 % 
- 8 9 1 % 
- 1 2 36% 
1„ ,-.:-
- 8 85% 
- 5 49% 
- 8 4 3 % 
- 7 13% 
- 1 5 48% 
- 5 89% 
-29.62% 
- 9 55% 
- 1 3 42% 
- 3 95% 
• > , ' 
;>' 
20 
?•>:• 
:x 
•'• 
If 
••' 
13 
• : 
" 
B 
i 
• 
.-
•-
a 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
:•' 
2 
. - • 
i 
• 
Mean 
7.26% 
- 3 91% 
1 ao% 
2.81% 
- 8 . 0 1 % 
Out-ot-Sample 
Counl 
20 
;,., 7 
? 
> 
Table 2 reports the mean semi-annual (raw) return by issuance number lor the 253 RELPs analyzed (in-sample) and idr 
Ihe 52 sponsors that had five or lewer RELPs (oul-of-samplel The Mest for mean dtfterences between the in-sample and 
out-of-sample groups lor ottering numbers 1 through 5 was insignificant m each case. Only observations 9 I I . and 12m 
the m-sample group have a return significantly different from zero at Ihe 0 10 level 
aggregate market performance, the general quality of the RELPs declines with 
offering number. This decline in returns is consistent with the notion that, in the 
aggregate, developers in our sample engaged in reputation building, 
The next series of statistical tests tries to identify which strategies individual 
developers may be following. Table 3 presents a test of mean and variance shifts. 
We find that four of the 20 developers (Century, CNL, Krupp, and Prudential) 
have significantly lower means (at the 0.05 level) in the second half of their of-
ferings. The pooled data and three developers (Angeles, Insured, and JMB) have 
significantly lower means at a significance level of 0.10. On the other hand, only 
Shurgard shows significantly higher returns in the second half of its offerings, in-
creasing returns are not predicted by any of the theoretical models. Although not 
a forma! prediction of either Diamond's or Shapiro's model. Table 3 also suggests 
that the variance is decreasing over subsequent offerings. In particular, three of 
the developers have significantly lower variances (at the 0.05 level) in the second 
half of their offerings: Angeles, Krupp, and Prudential. It is very interesting that 
each of these three also had significantly lower means in the first half of their 
offerings. 
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FIGURE 2 
Returns of Various Sponsors Sorted by Order of RELP Issuance 
Returns 
- Predated Returns 
Oi 
-0.5 
ReJp Order of issuance 
Figure 2 plots the adjusted returns tor each HELP inns issuance order The fitted regression line shows the negative trend 
in the returns This regression uses White's correction for heteroskedastic errors. 
TABLE 3 
Tests of Mean and Variance Shifts 
Aggregate 
Angeles 
Baicor 
Century 
CNL 
Consolidated 
CPA 
Damson 
Dean Witter 
First Capital 
Insured 
Integrated 
JMB 
Krupp 
McNeil 
MLH 
Prudential 
Public Storage 
RIC 
Shearson 
Shurgard 
Wear 
Tests 
//Hsu 
Statistics 
165 
i 50 
|3.55 
4.87" 
Z12-
' .' 
1.23 
5 .23x10 _ : i 
0.51 
-0.47 
1 | ! 
0.84 
1 56 
2 60-
0.58 
348x1CT ? 
3 76" 
- 0 24 
- 0 65 
0 84 
-3 .58" 
Variance 
Tests 
F 
Statist to 
1 49 
6 95-
0 44 
2 44 
188 
211 
:< 1 : 
1 55 
2.54 
1.48x10_;J 
132 
2.01 
139 38" 
1 56 
7 16 
4.37* 
1 4 2 x l 0 ~ ? 
4 0 2 x 1 0 _ : l 
0 55 
0 40 
p-Value tor F 
0.32 
2 .71x10 _ ? 
0.93 
0.24 
0 32 
0.27 
0.14 
0 39 
D.22 
0 99 
0 35 
0 37 
011 
4 05x 10 _ e 
0 32 
o.ia 
4 7 7 x 1 0 - ? 
0.98 
0.99 
0.81 
0 85 
Table 3 shows the results of testing for significant differences between the means and variances of sponsor returns in the 
first and second half ol their offerings * indicates significance Bt the 005 level 
B. Testing for Regime Shifts 
To simplify our exposition, we focus on developers that showed a significant 
decline in adjusted return in the second half of their offerings and that had more 
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than 10 offerings in our data. I8 This leaves us with five developers: Angeles. 
Insured, JMB, Krupp. and Prudential. For comparison, we also include aggregate 
results (when relevant) and results from the only developer. Shurgard, that had 
significantly higher quality in the second half of its offerings, 
Testing for different quality regimes and mixed strategies is done in three 
stages. Initially we use the Quandt-Ramsey approach to test for mixtures of dis-
tributions. Secondly we compute the Quandt ratios for these six developers to 
provide an informal test. Finally, we use the Brown-Durbin-Evans (BDE) tech-
nique to test for the statistical significance of a possible regime shift. While this 
analysis provides some evidence that certain sponsors appear to exploit their in-
formational advantages, these results should be taken as suggestive, since the un-
derlying distributional assumptions of the test are unlikely to be met in our small 
data set. To assist in the interpretation of these ratios, the adjusted returns are 
plotted in Figure 3. The Appendix presents details on the statistical techniques 
used. 
Table 4 reports the result of tests for mixtures of normals. For the aggregate 
data, there is a 43% probability (A) that returns are drawn from a distribution with 
a mean of 4.7% (/i[) and a 57% probability (1 - A) that returns are drawn from 
a distribution with a mean of -3.6% {fij). This mean difference is significant at 
the 5% level, but the difference in standard deviations is not significant. Table 4 
demonstrates that Angeles is primarily a low quality producer; the A value indi-
cates that there is a 91% probability that the mean-adjusted return on an Angeles-
issued RELP is -5.4% and a 9% probability that the return is 28.7%. Table 4 also 
shows significant evidence of mixing behavior for Krupp. There is a 30% chance 
that returns are drawn from a distribution with a high return (44.9%) and a high 
standard deviation (17.6%); there is a 70% chance thai the distribution has a mean 
of — 11.5% and a standard deviation of only 3.2%. The trend of returns in Figure 
3 indicates that prior to the seventh RELP issued, Krupp was primarily a high 
quality producer. The Quandt likelihood ratio and the BDE cumulative sum of 
squares are plotted against issuance sequence in Figure 4. The Quandt technique 
identities the regime break as the maximum of the plotted maximum likelihood 
ratio. The BDE technique signals a regime shift if the graph of the cumulative 
sum of squares moves outside the 95% fractile of the theoretical distribution. The 
techniques in Figure 4 jointly suggest that two of the developers in this subsample 
may be switching quality regimes: JMB (offering four) and Krupp (offering six). 
Generally the techniques are in agreement although, because of the sensitivity of 
these techniques to the initial observations, they can disagree. For example, with 
Prudential (offering seven), the Quandt ratio suggests a regime shift, but the BDE 
test fails to detect this. For Angeles. Insured, and Shurgard, the test fails to re-
ject the hypothesis of constant quality. These RELP sponsors either consistently 
produced the same quality or there were more than two switches between regimes. 
'"The results tor all developers are contained in a previous draft ot this paper, which is available 
from the authors. 
l9We Jo not report the R: statistic in Table 4 because in nonlinear estimation, the ft: is not guar-
anteed to he in the range of zero to one. In lieu of the ft- statistic, we report the Wald statistic, which 
turns out to be significant in all cases except for Shurgard. 
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A. Kfupp 
FIGURE 3 
Excess Returns on RELPs by Sponsor 
RELP Otterttig Humtef 
RELPOffarogNombef 
{continued on next page) 
The Quandt ratio shows that the change in quality occurred near the issuance 
of the fifth RELP offering by Angeles, while the BDE graph reveals that this 
quality change is insignificant at the 57c level. From Figure 3, it appears as if 
the fifth RELP issued was the only offering (with the possible exception of the 
third) that performed reasonably well, that is, was of "good" quality. The proiile 
of the returns on Prudential-sponsored RELPs resembles that of Angeles in terms 
of the A, ft i. and ^'m Table 4. Figure 3 also shows some evidence that Prudential 
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Excess Returns on RELPs by Sponsor 
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RFLP Otfem*g Numhef 
(continued on next page) 
engaged in reputation building, since the trend in adjusted returns associated with 
sequential RELP offerings is generally positive and increasing until the seventh 
RELP offering, where the Quandt ratio indicates that a possible change in quality 
occurred. This change in quality however, is not significant according to the BDE 
graph. As for Angeles. Table 4 shows that the means are statistically different. 
For Krupp, the returns from the first to the third RELP are increasing and suggest 
reputation building. Subsequent to the sixth offering, where the Quandt ratio in 
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FIGURE 3 (continued) 
Excess Returns on RELPs by Sponsor 
RELP Olteong Nurrtef 
RELP Offering Number 
Figure 3 shows the excess returns (adjusted lor Ihe year ol RELP formation) for lire six sponsors analyzed in detail 
Figure 4 reveals that a shift in quality occurred, Krupp was a consistently low 
quality producer. This shift from high quality to low quality is also evidenced by 
noting that fi i > [M2 and try > <T3 from Table 3, As with Angeles and Prudential, 
this evidence is consistent with a reputation effect. 
646 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 
TABLE A 
Tests for Mixed Slrategy Using Normal Mixtures 
RELP Sponsor 
Aggregate 
Angeles 
Insured 
JMB 
Krupp 
Prudential 
Shurgard 
A 
0 43' 
0 9 1 ' 
001 
0 02 
0 30' 
0 88' 
0 52 
m 
4 7" 
- 5 4" 
130 
tag-
44 9" 
- 4 r 
. ' • • ; 
w 
-3 ,8 " 
2a r 
- 1 5 
- 4 1 * 
-11.6* 
216" 
63 
"1 
: • • ' 
7 2 
33 0* 
17 e* 
3 
"S 
2.0 
2,0 
• r 
19 8' 
3.2" 
• : • • 
3 3 
CTHosid 
00001 
00006 
• : : ! .- ,< 
0 0053 
0 002H 
0 0027 
0.0014 
Maxft, 
009 
0.19 
0.17 
0.07 
0.03 
0.21 
0 lb 
Mint?, 
- 0 23 
- 0 13 
- 0 15 
- 0 08 
- 0 25 
- 0 07 
- 0 17 
Wald Test 
10 0" 
o.ooo-
0 009-
0.000* 
0.000' 
0.000* 
0 465 
To estimate the mixture of normals, the following moment-generating funcion >s minimized using weighted nonlm-nar leas! 
squares with ; == 15 TO ensure thaL the corresponding rorrnal equations are ot lull rank. 
£ i t =
 A«^ t«*?-?/» + {1 _ A)eV*^-i/* / = , , 2 15. 
Here y, represents the ad|usted return (in percentage) for the /th RELP offering ot a sponsor Parameter restrictions are 
tested using a Wald test wiih the level of significance reported in the last column of the table The null hypoihesis is thai 
/JT = (i ;J and rfy = crp. i e . that observations are drawn from a single normal distribution * indicates significance al the 
0 05 level 
C. Ex Ante Sponsor Characteristics 
Since these experiments suggest that certain developers in our sample have 
declining adjusted returns in their sequence of offerings, it is then interesting to 
investigate whether or not, ex ante, there are certain characteristics of the devel-
oper that affect this pattern of returns. This analysis is motivated by and related to 
the extensive literature dealing with equity offerings.2" specifically, the literature 
dealing with longer-term performance and the underwriting certification hypoth-
• "M 
esis. 
We initially investigate the relationship between sponsor characteristics and 
realized performance by analyzing the correlations between a set of developer 
characteristics22 and quality. The correlations are presented in Table 5. None 
of the correlations of sponsor characteristics vs. quality are greater than 0.37 in 
absolute value. The negative correlations, although insignificant at the 0.01 level, 
correspond to characteristics that relate to increasing size of the sponsor: number 
of offerings, a dummy variable for sponsors that are publicly traded, number of 
developer SICs, and total offering size. This suggests that the lemons premium is 
smaller for larger sponsors, presumably because of their greater initial reputation. 
To augment these correlations, a logistic regression (not shown) was performed 
with the dependent variable differentiating developers with a significant decrease 
in means in the second half of their offerings (cf. Table 3) from the remaining 
developers. Using a stepwise logistic approach, none of the sponsor variables 
were significant. This may be a further indication of the lack of transparency in 
this market. Even though these developers have observable ex ante characteristics 
that should lead investors to distinguish among them, apparently these differences 
have little influence on returns. 
;
"Our primary focus is not on issues relating to IPO tmderpricing since our assessment of quality 
is based on longer-term performance. 
-'See, for example, Beatty and Ritter (l°H6i on the former issue, and Booth and Smith (IslHfit OB 
(he latter. 
"See Table 5 for definitions. 
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FIGURE 4 
Comparison of Quandt's Log Likelihood Ratio with Brown-Durbin-Evans CuSumSq 
Residuals 
For the six sponsors analysed in detail, Figure 4 shows the results ol Quandl's and Brown. Durbin, and Evans' estimation 
of regime shilts 
A Quandi Ratio Angeles 
Offend Number 
S Brown Durbin Evans CSSQfl Angeles 
1.5 
Offering Number 
' • 9 5 * tractile o! the theoretical distribution 
— Cumulative Sum ill Squared Residuals 
(continued on next page) 
D. Alternative Hypotheses 
There are a number of competing hypotheses to explain the declining trend 
in abnormal returns. The most appealing alternative explanation is learning, either 
by the market or by the developer. In the first case, the uncertainty of the quality of 
the sponsor's offering declines as investors observe the performance of the earlier 
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FIGURE 4 (continued) 
Comparison of Quandt's Log Likelihood Ratio with Brown-Durbin-Evans CuSumSq 
Residuals 
10 11 12 13 
Oftenny Nwnbef 
D Brawn Durfun Evans CSSOP Insures 
Oflenrcg Ntimter 
• 95% fractile of the tfieorehcal disHHiTKm 
- Cumdatve Sum ol SquarBd ResriuaJs 
(continued on next page} 
RELPs. In the second case, the developer acquires more skill in asset selection, 
financing, management, or otherwise; this increasing skill leads to higher quality 
RELPs overtime. Our data are also, in general, consistent with this interpretation. 
There is another important factor that influences our empirical findings. 
Brown, Goet/.mann, and Ross (1995). henceforth BGR, show that survival bias 
can lead to the finding of decreasing returns over lime (as in the Diamond and 
Shapiro model) as well as decreasing variance over time. This survivorship bias 
has two possible effects on our analysis. First, our statistical tests are run with 
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FIGURE 4 (continued) 
Comparison of Quandl's Log Likelihood Ratio with Brown-Durbin-Evans CuSumSq 
Residuals 
E Quandt Rutin JMB 
Ctflenog Number 
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• 95% lr«l*e of l ie t r a g i c a l dist'ibulKm 
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{Continued on next page) 
only those developers that have issued six or more partnerships. Secondly, and 
perhaps more importantly, survival bias affects even those developers that were 
included in our sample. As pointed out by BGR, we would expect that develop-
ers of lower quality would have a higher probability of being censored out of our 
sample. Thus, the negative trend in returns, rather than being an outcome of a 
conscious attempt by the developer to build up a reputation, could merely result 
from the fact that surviving developers had "lucky" outcomes in their initial part-
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FIGURE 4 (continued) 
Comparison of Quandt's Log Likelihood Ratio with Brown-Durbin-Evans CuSumSq 
Residuals 
G Quandt Ratio Krupp 
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(conttnuedon nextpage) 
nerships. Similarly, high variance developers would have a greater probability of 
being censored out of our data. 
We address the first potential problem by comparing the mean (unadjusted) 
returns on sponsors with less than six partnerships (the out-of-sample group), 
with (hose included in our sample. We further restrict the out-of-sample group 
by deleting the sponsors that issued RELPs after 1990, which would not have 
been included in our sample. Although the out-of-sample group has a slightly 
higher mean return, a simple /-test indicates that the means are insignificantly 
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FIGURE 4 (continued) 
Comparison of Quandt's Log Likelihood Ratio with Brown-Durbin-Evans CuSumSq 
Residuals 
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(continued on next page) 
different from each other.23 To address the second survival bias effect, we regress 
the excess returns of the partnerships on a series of dummy variables for the year 
in which the partnership was formed. There is no apparent pattern in the dummy 
variables. A survival explanation would imply that partnerships formed earlier 
should have higher returns. Nevertheless, to account for possible year-specific 
21The mean in-sample relum is 12.4'J vs. 13,5% for the out-of-sample developers; the correspond-
ing f-statistie is —0.47, which is insignificant at ail conventional levels. The means test with all of the 
out-af-sample partnerships generates almost precisely the same result. 
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FIGURE 4 (continued) 
Comparison of Quandt's Log Likelihood Ratio with Brown-Durbin-Evans CuSumSq 
Residuals 
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effects, we conduct the above statistical tests on the returns adjusted for these 
dummy variable effects.24 These year-specific factors capture more than survival 
bias, such as the performance of the overall real estate market. In summary, it is 
likely that survival effects have a significant influence on our results. The above 
'""This regression run was abnormal return i>n year dummies. The results were abnormal return -
0.0035 duin77 -0.0754 dum7n 0.0517 dunvre+0.034 dumKO+0.1309 dum^ +0.0067 dumB2+0-0823 
dunim - 0.0151 dumg4 + 0.0OI K dunfe + 0.0763 duinw, 
dunixy; adj R: = 4.5fi'>f; p-value =0.0.14. 
0.0383 dumS7. - 0.0254 Jumna 0.0769 
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TABLE 5 
Correlation of Median Returns 
Nparl 
Public 
SIC 
Developer 
Offsrze 
Med ret 
Npart 
tooo 
0013 
(0 958) 
0 042 
(0 B62) 
o i t a 
0 532] 
0 750 
(0.000) 
- 0 035 
(0 884) 
Public 
1 000 
0.629 
(0 003) 
- 0 453 
(0 045) 
- 0 043 
|0 857) 
-0.217 
(0 359) 
SIC 
1 000 
- 0 499 
(0 025) 
0 066 
(0 783) 
- 0 368 
[0 113) 
Developer 
1 000 
0 127 
(0 5941 
0 342 
[0 141 I 
OffSI26 
1.000 
-0.156 
(0.512) 
' . ) : • : • • ' 
1 000 
Taoie 5 snows correlations Between sponsor characteristics and median raw returns Significance levels are indicated 
in parentheses. Npart is the number ot partnerships that each developer sponsored m our sample. Public is a dummy 
variable wilh one denoting a sponsor that s pupliciy Iradt'd. SIC is the number of SICs that the developer (or its parenti s 
engaged n. Devel is a dummy variable with one denoting a sponsor tnal is primarily a developei. Offside is the total size 
ot all offerings of the developer Medret is Ihe sponsor's overall medjan raw return 
tests suggest, however, that the magnitude of these effects is not so large as to 
invalidate our inferences. 
A final alternative explanation for declining quality over time is that, as the 
number of offerings increased, the sponsors moved away from their initial area of 
expertise. This could have been the case if attractive "local" investments became 
scarce. This diversification could have been by location or by type of property, 
for example, moving from investment in office buildings to residential real estate. 
Table 6 provides a brief description of the sequence of offerings by type and 
location for the six sponsors studied in detail. The table generally supports the 
conclusion that deviating from the original investment strategy contributed to the 
decline in returns. Four of the sponsors with declining returns (Century, JMB, 
Krupp. and Prudential) moved away from their initial investment focus as the 
number of offerings increased, typically becoming more diverse in type of real 
estate investment, rather than in location. 
E. Alternative Measures of Quality 
We also performed robustness checks to ensure that our proxy for quality, ad-
justed return over the period 1990 to 1995, is reasonable. One measure of quality 
is the total dividends received until 1990. Table 7 shows an OLS regression (with 
White's correction for heteroskedasttcity) using cumulative dividends as the de-
pendent variable. The table shows that, even after correcting for partnership age, 
partnership sequence number has a significantly negative effect. This is consistent 
with our finding that issuance number has a significant negative effect on adjusted 
return.2'' 
2
*A second alternative measure of quality was tested: the Partnership Profile financial condition 
rating at the end of l^sy. This rating embodies both quantitative and quaiitative aspects of the RELP. 
We performed an ordered probit analysis (not shown here) to predict this rating. While the overall 
tit was significant, none of the key characteristics (partnership issuance number, operating margin. 
leverage, age. and size) were. 
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TABLE 6 
Investment Strategy of Sponsor 
Sponsor hvestment Strategy 
Century For the firsl four partnerships, this sponsor held a diversified portfolio of apartment. office, and relai 
properties located in the SunPelt and West Coast areas. The sponsor then invested in other property 
types such as industrial and mobile homes In addition, their locations! preference shifted to the Midwest 
and Soulhaast 
CNL This sponsor lollowed a cansistenl strategy, focusing exclusively on fasl food restaurant properties 
leased on a triple net leased basis to major chains such as Burger King and Taco Bell Properties 
were located across the nation. 
JMB The initial RELPs were geographically diverse and mainly invested in offices and retail properties After 
the 11lh RELP, the sponsor began to diversify somewhat into raw land and into real estale debt rather 
than its previous equity investment. 
Krupp The initial RELPs were primarily invested in apartments Later, the sponsor shifted its focus to shopping 
centers The later flELPs also invested in apartments by taking a tisky debt position instead of equity. 
as done earlier These debt instruments included participating first mortgage and construction loans 
Prudential The sponsor initially focused on self-storage properties and office warehouses, primarily in Sunbelt 
locations The focus then shifted to either apartments or retail properties (equity ownership) or tax 
exempt participating first mortgage revenue bonds on apartments While the sponsor still emphasized 
Sunbelt areas, investment also started to occur m non-Sunbelt locations 
Shurgard This sponsor focuses solely on sBlf-stcrage warehouses Us initial tocational preference was West Coast 
and Midwest cities with large populations The sponsor later expanded their geographical orientation to 
also include Texas, Georgia, and East Coast states with large populations. 
Table 6 summarizes the evolution of the sponsor's strategy (in terms of location and type of investment) over its sequence 
of offerings Only the six sponsors analyzed in detail are included 
aUnder a triple net lease, the tenant pays for utilities, property taxes, insurance, and property maintenance in addition to 
paying the rent on the property 
TABLE 7 
Regressions on Dividends Paid 
Coefficient pAralue 
Constant 
Partnership issuance number 
PPI financial condition rating 
Operating margin 
Leverage (%) 
Age of partnership 
Log of initial offering size (in millions) 
No ol obs 
Ad] R? 
Regression p-value 
Model I 
0 408 
(0 000) 
- 0 172 
(0 000) 
134 
4B 5% 
0000 
Model II 
0 327 
(0 019) 
- 0 0 1 2 
(0 029) 
-0.O20 
(0 157) 
0079 
(0 375) 
- 0 . 3 1 2 
(0 005) 
0052 
(0 000) 
- 0 0 5 4 
(0 006) 
115 
77 B% 
0.000 
Table 7 displays the results ol two regressions with the dependent variable being the sum of all dividends (paid from 
issuance dale to the end of 1989) as a percentage of offering size Partnership number is the offering number for the given 
sponsor PPI financial condition rating is the Stanger rating as ol t989 Operating margin is operating income in 1989 over 
gross 1939 revenues Leverage is total debl over the partnerships cost basis as of 1989 Age of the partnership is the 
number of years from the offering date until 1989 Initial capital raised is lota! oflermg size All regressions use the White 
correction for heteroshedasticity The regressions also used fxed effects to account for sponsor characteristics, these 
coefficients are not shown in order to Focus on the more relevant issues The number of observations varies because of 
the lack of accounting data for some partnerships 
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F. Ex Post Analysis 
One possible explanation for our findings is that a number of developers 
exploited the informational asymmetries in this market. Informal evidence for this 
comes from a variety of popular press articles. In particular, Prudential Securities, 
in the fall of 1993, agreed to pay $371 million to settle complaints about its sales 
activity and promised returns in oil and gas and real estate limited partnerships. 
Prudential Securities, in an agreement with the Justice Department, admitted to 
fraud in selling $8 billion of limited partnership units, Our statistical analysis 
suggests that the returns on Angeles-sponsored RHLPs appear to be drawn from 
two regimes with the mean return being significantly lower in the second half of 
its offerings. In a news story that appears to support this conclusion,26 a reporter 
wrote that this: 
West Los Angeles-based company has had an extraordinarily rich his-
tory as an incubator of some of the greatest investment stars—and some 
of the biggest flops—of the modem era . . . How the 60 year old Elliott 
(CEO) and his crew avoided the corporate gallows for so long is a clas-
sic tale of management making promises it couldn't keep, to investors 
who didn't know better. 
Angeles survived several financial crises, including a crash in the ski resort 
condo market, by focusing on "cash flow" rather than real earnings until the cash 
flows on properties became nonexistent. The crises that finished Angeles involved 
investing in outlet malls and congregate care apartments; both were high-risk ven-
tures involving heavy cash infusions. 
In addition, two of the developers in our sample have gone bankrupt (Inte-
grated Resources and Angeles Corporation) and most of the sponsors have changed 
organizational form to convert their RELPs into either real estate investment trusts 
(REITs) or master limited partnerships (MLPs). Shurgard appears to be the only 
high quality producer on a relative basis. Published reports27 on Shurgard seem 
to support this view. 
V. Conclusions 
This study empirically investigates the dynamics of quality setting and repu-
tation using a unique database of returns on a series of real estate limited partner-
ships by the same developer, By examining the time series of a given developer's 
performance, we obtain important insights into the developer's strategy in deter-
mining its optimal trade-off between reputation and short-term profits. We also 
"Tom Petruno, May 7, 1993, "Broken promises finally elip the wings of Angeles anJ its investors." 
Ijts Angeles Times. 
27Tim Urbonya, February 2S, I9XX, "Self-Storage: Sueeess Breeds Change," New York Times, sec-
tion S, p. 1, column 1. Karen Milburn. July 2. 149-0, "Shurgard and Limited Partners Spawn over 200 
Storage Sites," Pugel Sound Business Journal 11, p. 19A. Ken Ber/.of, March 19. 1989, "Investment 
Patience May Pay Off," The Courier-Journal. Jeanne Sather, June 19, 1992, "Commercial Storage 
Now More of Shurgard Factor," Pugel Sound Business Journal, 13(6), p. 32. More specifically, news 
reports indicate that Shurgard has a historical annual average return on investment of around ISC, (not 
market adjusted). Shurg;ud builds and manages over 2(K) mini-storage warehouses. Shurgard forms 
limited partnerships to provide ail of the financing for the real estate deal with no reliance on debt. 
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ohtain some understanding of the extent to which investors and RELP developers 
behave in this inl'ormationally opaque market. 
We find that, as predicted by the Diamond and Shapiro models, in the aggre-
gate, the average return declines with offering number. One interpretation of this 
result is that several sponsors, such as Angeles, Krupp, and Prudential, appear 
to exploit the opportunities created by informational inefficiencies. This is evi-
denced by the returns on their sequence of RELPs issued being initially positive 
followed by negative returns on subsequent offerings. We also find significant 
evidence that these three developers also engage in mixed strategies, shifting be-
tween quality regimes, perhaps in an effort to make detection of their true quality 
more difficult. While these empirical findings correspond with known ex post 
facts, in particular the negative reports on Krupp and Prudential and the positive 
reports on Shurgard. the relatively small number of observations implies that these 
results are suggestive, rather than conclusive. Furthermore, we have shown that 
factors such as learning, survivorship bias, and increasing diversified strategies by 
the sponsor also contribute to the observed decline in returns. 
Appendix: Empirical Methodology 
This appendix briefly overviews our empirical approaches. Evidence that a developer 
is using a mixing strategy is evaluated using Ihe switching regression model of Quandt 
(I95X), (I960). (1972)." ' This model assumes the existence of two regression regimes 
with a single unknown switch point between the two regimes. If there are T observations, 
the tirst l observations (sequential offerings of RELPs) are assumed to come from a regime 
with a given quality level, while the last T — ! observations represent RELP offerings from 
a different quality regime. The null hypothesis that sponsors do not change the level of 
quality in their RELP offerings is tested against the alternative proposition that a single 
change in quality occurs. The problem is to estimate the lime, if any. at which the sponsor 
switches from one quality regime to another. We model the two different quality regimes 
as follows. 
( 1 ) H = <l\+,i]t+£l 
(2) H - Q2+/£rf+£2 , 
where R is the adjusted holding period return on the rth REl.P issued by a particular spon-
sor, and f i and s% are independent, normally distributed error terms with mean zero and 
standard deviations ci\ and <n, respectively. This modeling of the quality regimes is moti-
vated by the prediction of the Shapiro and Diamond models concerning the declining trend 
in quality. 
The estimated location of the unknown (single) switch point t involves choosing as 
the maximum likelihood estimate (he value off that maximizes 
(3) \(t) = - r i ogx / ik r - f log t f i - ( r - / ) l o g < J 2 - y . 
More specifically, the procedure entails first ordering our REEPs in issuance date se-
quence. Separate regressions are then estimated for each of these groups. Next, the point 
"Brown and Goet/mann t l'W7) use switching regressions to analy/.e mutual fund styles. 
""All of the mixed strategy tests were performed only for those developers for which we had data 
on at least 11 partnerships. Kleven of the 20 sponsors qualified under (his criteriiin. The value of this 
cutoff level is somewhat arbitrary. However, reliable estimation of mixed strategies requires a greater 
number of observations than simple mean or variance tests. 
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of division between the two groups is moved by one time unit and anew set of regressions 
is estimated. This process is repeated Feral] possible division points. There is no unbiased 
test statistic associated with this maximum likelihood procedure, especially in small sam-
ples (as in the present ease) given contamination effects associated with the switch point.1" 
As such, even though a particular plot may suggest that a switch has occurred, this point 
may not be statistically significant. 
To overcome this deficiency in Quandt's likelihood ratio (LR) test. Brown, Durhin, 
and Evans (BDE) proposed a test of nonstationarity that can be used with the LR test to 
determine if a given switch point is significant.11 In this approach, the recursive residuals, 
Wt, are computed as follows, 
Yi - f l f - l — ii:-\Xi 
1 {x,-x,-\f 
+
 r + — i 
r— 1 <~\ , J2 U- - *i-1 )" 
i = i 
Here n,- \, 0,-\, and_v,-i are the least squares estimators and the sample mean based 
on the first t — 1 observations. If the null hypothesis of a constant n and ,j is true, these 
residuals are independent standard normals. By plotting the cumulative sum of squares, .v,, 
defined as 
(5) .v, = ^ ! — , 
against time (number of offerings), we can reject the null hypothesis if the graph of x, 
crosses the significance line. Thus, if the switch indicated by the BDE is close to the 
peak of the likelihood ratio, then we can conclude that there exist two distinct regression 
regimes. However, the BDE lest could indicate nonstationarity without the LR showing 
any distinct peak. In this case, we would conclude that the quality changed gradually over 
time. 
Both Quandl's LR and the BDE test assume that there is a single change in regression 
regimes. However, this need not always be the case. To address this problem, Quandt 
and Ramsey IQR) (!°78) propose another test for the existence of two regression regimes. 
They assume that at each point in time, nature (in our case, the developer) picks one regime 
with probability A and the other regime with probability 1 — A. 
The QR model assumes that the probability density function associated with the 
RELP quality for a given sponsor represents a mixture of (at most) two normal densities. 
The null hypothesis, that sponsors do not change the level of quality in their RELP offer-
ings. is tested against the alternative proposition that two quality regimes exist. Formally. 
we model the two different levels of quality as 
(6) RB: ~ N [jt\,a\\ with probability A 
RH, "- N Uiz.rr'A with probability^ I — A), 
where the parameters A, (ii, fi2. o\, and n'z are unknown. The two distributions of returns 
represent two different modes of sponsor behavior with A measuring the probability that 
a sponsor chooses the first quality level. A disadvantage of this method is that it cannot 
"Contamination is associated with the interval around the dividing point between the two groups 
ot observations, / and T - I observations. In essence, one does not know which regime the dala are 
associated with. 
"See Mehta and Beranek (lL)N2l for an application to detecting changes in beta. 
\ 
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identify which points belong to a particular regime. However, in this study, we are mainly 
interested in the existence of two regimes and identification of the regime to which an 
observation belongs i.s less important. 
To estimate the mixture of normal distributions and A, the moment-generating func-
tion (MGF), E{e y), is minimized using weighted nonlinear least squares with the number 
(a) of values of 9 set equal to 15 to ensure that the corresponding normal equations are of 
full rank,12 
(7) ( E 1 ^ ) = J ^ ' * ' + * ^ + ( l - A ) « « , / * - # ' a 7 = 1 , 2 15. 
Since #s determine the weights lor the moments of the data by the MGF estimator, 
relatively small #.s were chosen (to the extent possible) so that low-order moments receive 
more weight. The Davidon-Fletcher-Powell algorithm is used to minimize the MGF. The 
parameters are estimated using nonlinear weighted least squares where the weights are the 
reciprocal of the disturbance variance. 
Quandt and Ramsey (1978) argue that the preceding MGF has several advantages 
over using a maximum likelihood (MLE) function.3'1 Most importantly, the MGF can be 
used with relatively small samples having considerable overlap in the two populations and 
the parameters obtained are unique estimates. The MGF method also yields consistent and 
asymptotically normal estimates. The asymptotic distribution of the MGF is independent 
of the 8 parameters. In conjunction with the estimation of the mixture of normals, we use 
a Wald statistic to determine if the two normal distributions are identical (H„ :(i\ = fii and 
u\ = as). 
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